Mississippi residents think that AIDS is God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior.
Only 16 percent of Rhode Island residents share that view.
Using state and county level regressions, we explore a number of different hypotheses about the long run historical causes of differences in beliefs over space. We find little support these cultural differences represent long-standing differences in religiosity or the legacy of slavery.
Instead, our regressions support the idea that Blue State culture reflects primarily the legacy of different ethnicities working together at high densities: the most important historical explanatory variables are the share of the labor force in manufacturing in 1920 and the share of the population that was foreign born in 1920 strongly predict liberal beliefs and voting for John Kerry. We interpret these results as suggesting that the liberal views that reduced traditional social divisions came about because there were gains to reducing economic and religious conflicts that could derail interactions in the marketplace.
The second important truth captured by the red state/blue state framework is that political parties and politicians have had an increasing tendency to divide on cultural and religious issues rather than on economic differences. Again, in historical perspective, cultural politics is not unusual. In the late 19 th century, "Rum, Romanism and rebellion" were the core issues that determined the Republican Party. The true aberration was the midtwentieth century era of economic politics.
Why has culture dominated politics so much more effectively than economics during much of American history? Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005) , following Downs (1957), present a model where extremism occurs because political divisions are needed to mobilize infra-marginal voters, but going to extremes is only rational when political messages are heard disproportionately by your own supporters. Political divisions therefore follow social cleavages because social organizations allow politicians to send targeted messages. .This models helps us to understand why economic divisions between the parties only became entrenched in the middle 20 th century, with the rise of the labor movement and its growing connection to the Democratic Party, and why as unions have lost their importance, religion has again come to dominate political debate.
Myths of American Political Geography
We now discuss five myths of American political geography.
Myth # 1: America is divided into two politically homogeneous areas
Does the red state/blue state paradigm that describes the remarkable spatial configuration of Democrats on the coast and Republicans in the heartland mean that Americans are increasingly living in politically homogenous states, so that a smaller number of people live in swing states? Is it true, as E. J. Dionne (2003) 
Myth # 2: The two parties are more spatially segregated than in the past
Even though the number of states that can by considered "safe" for either party has not been rising over time, there could be more political segregation at the local level. However, the county-level evidence shows that segregation by party is not significantly increasing, and it is in fact much lower than many other forms of segregation.
There are two usual indices of racial segregation that can also be used to measure political segregation: dissimilarity and isolation. The dissimilarity index measures the share of the total population of either group 1 or group 2 that would need to be moved across areas for there to be an equal proportion of group 1 in every area. 1 A high dissimilarity index indicates a large degree of segregation; if a large share of the population must move in order to be evenly distributed, then the population must currently be highly segregated. The isolation index measures the share of the population belonging to group 1 where the average member of group 1 lives. A high isolation index where refers to the population of group i for i=1 or 2 in a geographic area and refers to the total population of group i. also indicates a large degree of segregation; if the typical member of group 1 lives in an area where the proportion of group1 greatly exceeds the proportion of group 1 in the total population, then the population is highly segregated. 
Myth # 3: America's political geography is more stable than in the past
While the segregation of the political parties hasn't increased significantly, it may still be true that American political divisions are hardening, and that political patterns are becoming more permanent. As Harold Meyerson (2004) Perhaps, American politics is becoming increasingly geographically stable over time.
Indeed, the myth in this case is not the stability of political geography-political geography is quite stable-but rather that this stability is new or unusual. This is high, but not unlike the degree of electoral stability engendered in the re-election campaigns of Eisenhower or Franklin Roosevelt. In these cases, the correlation coefficients were also in the mid-90s. Over the past 20 years, smoothing out election-byelection variation, the correlation has been lower than during 1932-1960 or 1868-1908. Stability has been the norm, not the exception, in American electoral history, and recent trends have brought us back to this norm.
Myth # 4: America's cultural divisions are increasing
A steady stream of rhetoric proclaims that "there is a religious war going on in this country, a cultural war as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as the Cold War itself, for this war is for the soul of America" (this example is from Davis and Robinson, 1997) . Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2004) provide a rich set of examples showing that across a wide range of issues, the distribution of preferences is single-peaked: most people are in the middle of the distribution and not at the extreme. We will later disagree with Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2004) in our interpretation of American political geography, as we believe that there are significant cultural divisions across space and people: Mississippi is not Massachusetts. But we do not disagree with their evidence that divisions across people and space have not been increasing over time.
For example, consider polling evidence on extreme views about abortion. From 1972 From to 2004 , the share of the population taking the position that abortion should never be permitted has varied in a narrow band between 10-13 percent, according to data from the National Election Surveys. Conversely, the fraction of the population taking the position that abortion should never be forbidden or that a women should always be able to obtain an abortion (the precise wording of the question varied over time) rose from 25 percent in the 1970s to roughly 35 percent in the 1980s, before peaking at about 45 percent in 1992 and declining back to the 1980s levels since then. Overall, any purported increase in abortion extremism amounts to essentially no change in the share of the population who is extremely opposed to abortion and the share of those who believe abortion should never be forbidden fluctuating somewhat, but currently standing at the same level as the 1980s. Similarly, while many Americans are opposed to homosexuality, on the whole, Americans have become significantly more tolerant of homosexuality now then they were 20 years ago. We are not living in an era of increasing cultural divisions between people, even if politicians are increasingly dividing on these issues.
Myth # 5: America's political divisions are increasing
A final myth is that we live in an era of increasingly polarized politics, where individuals from different parties increasingly despise one another, or as Lawrence (2002) Republican Party is higher than it has ever been. Democratic hostility for the Republican Party is higher than it has ever been. As such, there is certainly some truth to the view that we are currently experiencing a strongly partisan period, but this does not appear to represent any sort of a secular trend. This division really began in 2000 and seems to be more of a George W. Bush effect than any ongoing move towards greater partisan hostility. Of course, it remains to be seen if partisanship declines in the post-Bush era.
The First Reality of American Political Geography: Cultural Heterogeneity
These myths have led some observers to suggest that there is no truth to the "Culture War" metaphor or that the red state/blue state division is just plain false. While there are misleading elements of these frameworks, amidst all myths, these ideas also contain two great, essential truths. First, America is a nation of enormous cultural and economic diversity. This diversity is not new and it shouldn't be news, but it is still the central fact of American cultural geography. We earn, consume and believe wildly different things in different parts of this country. To an economist, perhaps the most striking thing is that beliefs can differ so much over space.
Second, American political parties have increasingly become organized around cultural and religious fissures. 30 years ago, income was a better predictor of party than religious attendance. Today, religion rather than earnings predicts Republicanism. The rise of religious politics is not without precedent. Prior to 1930, the correlation between religion and party affiliation across states seems to have been at least as strong as it is today. Nonetheless, this cultural division is a central political fact of the last 25 years. 5 One potential issue with a table of this nature is that these samples are not huge and we should expect to see significant variation. However, the variation across states is much higher than we would expect from random sampling error. On average, each state has 440 respondents, and if the true response probabilities were the same across states, we would expect the standard deviation of state level averages to be .023. The standard deviation of the state means is more than four times this amount. We can soundly reject the view that differences across states just reflect sampling error.
Heterogeneity of Economics and Society
firing such teachers. The standard deviation of state mean is more than four times the standard deviation of state means that would be expected from random sampling error.
The second and third panels show similar geographic heterogeneity in the responses to the statements "It is okay for blacks and whites to date" and "AIDS is God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior." While the extreme left and ring wing states as defined by these first three questions are not the same, the correlations among them are quite high.
e.g., the correlation between the belief that schools should fire homosexual teachers and approval of black-white dating is -77 percent. Figure 5 shows that responses to these cultural statements are highly correlated across states with voting Democratic in the last election. In no state that went for Kerry did the share of respondents agreeing with the statement "AIDS is God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior" exceed 38 percent. In no state that went for Bush did the share of respondents answering no to this question fall below 28 percent. The overall correlation coefficient across states between this variable and voting is -70 percent. The figure also illustrates that there is a continuous distribution of beliefs over space, not two nations. The variation is striking, but the distribution is not bi-modal.
The fourth and fifth panels show that geographic heterogeneity in political beliefs is not limited to cultural issues, but it extends into foreign and economic policies as well.
These panels indicate the share of respondents that agree with the statements "the best way to ensure peace is through military strength" and "when something is run by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful." The differences in the fraction who agree with these statements between the most liberal and conservatives states are 30-40 percent. Again, America is not two nations, but it does have a lot of geographic heterogeneity in its beliefs.
The heterogeneity of political beliefs is accompanied by striking geographic small to make comparisons across states, but across regions the variation is significant.
In the Pacific region, 49 percent of respondents say that they believe in the devil; in the East South Central region, 82 percent of respondents say that they believe in the devil. The regional patterns on moral issues appear to be remarkably durable. Today, the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions are today America's most liberal regions (along with the Pacific Coast). These regions appear to have had liberal views as early as the 1930s.
In 1936-37 Gallup polls, across the U.S., 67 percent of respondents said that they would vote for a qualified Catholic for President and 49 percent of respondents said that they would vote for a quality Jew for President. In New England and the Mid-Atlantic region, 74 and 79 percent of respondents said that they would support a qualified Catholic and 62
and 59 percent of respondents said that they would support a qualified Jew, which made these two regions the most tolerant in the county along these dimensions. They were also the most liberal regions in favoring support for federal funding of venereal disease, supporting a free press and opposing the sterilization of criminals. Importantly, in those days, New England had the most conservative views on economic policy.
One of the peculiarities of American geography is that ardent Christianity and belief in the military tend to go together. Across states, the correlation between the share of respondents who say that prayer is an important part of my daily life and the share of respondents who say that the best way to ensure peace is through military strength is 73 percent. One can certainly interpret the Gospels as having an anti-military message, but this doesn't seem to be the interpretation favored by America's most active Christians. These differences in beliefs within the U.S. drive home one central point about human cognition: the Bayesian approach to learning offers little hope for understanding the remarkable heterogeneity in beliefs across individuals and space (Glaeser 2004) . In these rational models, disagreement is difficult, let alone the wild level of dispersion of beliefs that we see. After all, there is no real difference in the evidence that these different states have been exposed to, yet they have come to radically different conclusions, and continue to hold these conclusions despite being aware that others disagree. Despite Aumann (1976) , Americans wholeheartedly agree-to-disagree. One natural alternative model is that people base opinions mostly on the views of those around them. As such, local interactions are critical, and these provide plenty of possibility for wide geographic variation (as in Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996 The variance in the share of the population that takes the Bible to be the literal word of God has fallen. The variance of the share that thinks that the government is often inefficient and wasteful has risen. Overall, it is hard to see a general trend. The nation is different and it has been so for many years.
The Causes of American Cultural Diversity
While the differences in political and social beliefs across space are striking and while many of these correlations are provocative, these correlations give us little idea about what factors explain differences in beliefs across the United States. In this section, we consider three possible explanations: long-standing differences in religious adherence across states, the legacy of slavery, and diversity in the marketplace. The first hypothesis suggests that the fundamental difference between areas within the U.S. is simply the degree of religiosity. The second hypothesis is that regional differences fundamentally reflect the legacy of slavery and the Civil War.
The third hypothesis -diversity in marketplace--suggests that areas where diverse populations interacted in market settings developed beliefs that reduced ethnic and religious conflict. According to this view, if ethnic groups interact at high densities, they either destroy each other or eventually develop ideologies that minimize conflict. The results with ethnic-fractionalization indicies which include race as well as foreign-born ancestry change the results discussed below slightly. Specifically, the significance the slavery measure increases slightly for several of the outcomes, and the significance of the log of density decreases slightly.
of the population that worked in manufacturing in 1920. This variable is highly correlated with the density and urbanization of an area, and we see it as a proxy for high density economic interactions. We have obtained similar results using the share of the population in 1920 that lives in cities with more than 25,000 people.
Regressions (1)- (6) show our results for states and regression (7) shows the connection between these explanatory variables and the share voting for Kerry at the county level. In the state level regressions, the explanatory power is quite high and r-squareds run from 48 percent to 70 percent. In the county level regressions, the r-squared is 14 percent.
The first row shows the impact of evangelism in 1926. Evangelicalism in 1926 is statistically significant in four out of seven specifications. For example, it significantly predicts approval of black-white dating and belief in peace through strength, and it weakly predicts the belief that AIDS is a punishment from God and the importance of prayer. In most cases, the coefficients are reasonably large, but due to the high correlation of the independent variables, this variable is not highly significant. In univariate regressions, the evangelicalism variable is almost always significant.
In the second row, we see the coefficients on the slave population in 1850. In this case, the coefficients are typically small and quite insignificant. The same is true of the categorical variable depicting membership in the confederacy. There are two variables which this variable (or the confederacy variable) is correlated with -the belief in peace through strength and, somewhat surprisingly, a belief in the efficiency of government.
These effects, while significant, are still quite small. While it is not impossible that the legacy of slavery matters, there is no sense that support for Republicanism is determined by the borders of the old slave states, and despite E. J. Dionne's views, there is little evidence to suggest that current political and social divisions reflect the ongoing legacy of the Civil War.
In the third row, we look at the importance of percent foreign born in 1920. In this case, the coefficients are generally significant economically and statistically. The change appears to have begun even at the end of the eighteenth century, as "merchants increasingly were dependent on their commerce with the outside world and believed in seeking an accommodation with that world" (Bremer, 1995, p. 173) .
Between 1690 and 1710, traditional Puritanism declined. The state legislature pushed Increase Mather, a champion of traditional Puritanism, out as President of Harvard.
Merchants, like Thomas Brattle, endowed more liberal churches, and, in 1699, the "Brattle Street Manifesto" affirmed a far more tolerant form of Congregationalism.
The decline of strict Puritanism appears to have been primarily the result of actions by merchants like Brattle and Elisha Cooke who followed the merchant led community in New York towards a more religiously tolerant and less religious community (the stricter
Congregationalists of course founded a competing college in New Haven).
This hypothesis does not mean to suggest that diversity always leads to tolerance.
Indeed, in many cases, diversity leads at least initially to hatred and ethnic conflict (Glaeser, 2005) . However, if different religious or ethnic groups are prevented from using the power of the state to disenfranchise, enslave or kill each other, and if there exists a powerful group that benefits from eliminating conflict, then diversity can eventually lead to a watering down of core religious tenets or ethnic animosities.
The Second Reality of American Political Geography: Politics follows Culture
Around the 2004 election, many authors commented on the remarkable correlation between the tendency to go to church and the tendency to vote Republican.
The overall correlation between income and Republicanism among white males is essentially zero outside of the extremes of the income distribution (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro, 2005) . However, the relationship between Religion and Republicanism is extremely strong throughout the distribution. Individuals who go to church once a month 
where can) Pr(Republi is a categorical variable taking on a value of one if the individual votes republican, ) ln(Income i is the logarithm of family income, church attendance is a categorical variable taking on a value of one if the individual attends church once per month or more. The X vector includes controls for gender, race, education and age.
As before, we have excluded voters who chose neither Republicans nor Democrats. The black line shows the effect of log of income, and the grey line the effect of attending church once a month or more. The coding of religion in the National Election Survey changed in 1972, so it is inappropriate to compare the magnitude of effects before that date with the magnitudes after then. 12 The figure suggests that in the 1970s and before, the coefficients on income and church attendance were comparable. Since 1980, religion has become much more important.
To analyze longer historical patterns in the relationship between income and Republicanism, we turn to county level election returns and during each election from 1864 until today we regress: Our results contrast with those presented by Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder (2006) who argue that economics remains a more important predictor of political orientation than morals. Our results differ because they use opinions on issues to predict voting and we use actual income and religious attendance. Income doesn't strongly predict voting
Republican but their economic issues index does. On moral issues both opinions and harder variables like church attendance predict Republicanism.
To believe Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder's (2006) view that economic issues continue to trump moral issues, you must believe that the importance of economic voting should be measured by using opinion surveys about economics rather than actual income.
If these survey opinions are the result of political affiliation rather than the cause (either because of social persuasion as in Murphy and Shleifer, 2004 , or because of a desire for internal consistency), then it would make little sense to regress voting on opinions. The first reason to question the use of these surveys is that responses are weakly correlated with individual economic status and correlations at the state level generally go in the wrong direction. Economic opinions don't appear to respond to economic interests.
A second issue with the Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder (2006) economic issues index is that this index is the result of factor analysis designed to find opinions that tend to go together. The opinions that go together and are labeled "economic issues" are an odd mix including enthusiasm for government spending, environmentalism, health insurance and labor unions. These views have little in common other than being major parts of the Democratic platform, and one plausible interpretation of the factor analysis is that instead of finding exogenous preferences for economic policy, they have identified the common factor that is ideological loyalty to the Democratic Party.
A third reason to be suspicious of economic opinions is the pattern of regional change, especially relative to the persistence of moral opinions (New England was liberal on religious issues in the 1930s and remains so today). In the 1930s, Republican New
England was anti-government and pro-free market and the Democratic South was strongly pro-redistribution. These opinions have completely flipped as party affiliations have flipped. There is no sense that the changing patterns reflect changing economic fortunes, because after all, these opinions remain negatively correlated with economic realities. As such, we think that it is more sensible to look at hard variables that capture economics and religion, like income and church attendance, and these variables show a steady increase in the correlation between religiosity and Republicanism relative to the constant correlation or declining correlation between Republicanism and income. The abortion gap between the parties is mirrored by gaps in many religious or cultural policies. The Republican platform also opposes gay marriage and embryonic stem cell research. Democrats have clearly taken opposing positions on these and similar issues.
By contrast, in the debate over the Iraq war, John Kerry claimed to differ primarily in his competence and ability to bring in allies, not in his commitment to fighting America's enemies. In the economic sphere, both party platforms trumpet their commitment to reducing taxes (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro, 2005) . The starkest differences in both public statements of candidates and in the wording of the platforms occur along moral dimensions. Given the statements of party platforms, it is no surprise then that religion predicts party preference better than income.
The recent rise in the connection between politics and religion hardly represents something new in American politics. In the pre-modern era, religion was also a central many different ways of performing this exercise, but this provides a simple sense of the 13 Steensland, et al (2000) provide a basic description of the major differences between Mainlines and Evangelicals: "Mainline denominations have typically emphasized an accommodating stance toward modernity, a proactive view on issues of social and economic justice, and pluralism in their tolerance of varied individual beliefs. Evangelical denominations have typically sought more separation from the broader culture, emphasized missionary activity and individual conversion, and taught strict adherence to particular religious doctrines."
correlates of Republicanism, at least at the county level, in the time period before opinion polling.
The bottom line charts the changing relationship between the Republican Party and evangelicals. During the early time period, even controlling for being a Southern county, evangelical counties were much more likely to be Democratic than to be Republican.
Over the last 25 years that has changed, and today there is a significant positive relationship between the share of the religious population that is evangelical and the share of the population that voted for George Bush. As the share of the population that is evangelical increases by one percentage point, the share voting Republican increases by .13 percentage points.
But the graph makes it clear that while the connection between Republicanism and evangelicalism may be new, the connection between religion and politics is not. The connection between mainline Protestantism and Republicanism during the late 19 th century was much stronger than the correlation between evangelicalism and Republicanism today. Even as late as the Eisenhower era, this connection remained strong. Of course, this correlation is partly a reflection of the strong ties between the Republican Party and the mainstream churches, but it is also a reflection of the equally strong ties between the Democrats and the Catholic Church.
The conclusion from this graph is that religion has usually played a role in party divisions. The patterns have changed. Today attendance is a bigger predictor of voting Republican. In the past, mainline Protestantism predicted Republicanism. In the next section, we turn to explanations of the connection between religion and political divisions.
Explaining Party Divisions
The traditional problem with explaining why parties divide on some issues rather than others is that the prevailing paradigm in political science has been the median voter theorem. This result pushes strongly towards the implication that parties will rush to the center, and if all parties are at the center then there is little possibility of explaining why
Republicans and Democrats split on religion rather than economics.
To the extent that there has been an alternative paradigm, it is that the preferences of leaders or elites pull parties away from the median voter. In this case, party leaders sacrifice votes to achieve their own goals, and the implication is that parties will divide on issues that party elites really care about. This theory can potentially explain the division on religion. It wouldn't be surprising if party leaders had stronger preferences for religion-related issues than for tax policy, especially if they interact in social organizations that emphasize religion (Murphy and Shleifer, 2004) . Indeed, it is quite possible that this does explain part of the tendency of parties to split on these cultural issues: this is what party leaders do seem to care most about.
Unfortunately, this theory gives us little guidance about why the connection between religion and party affiliation has changed over time, or why the connection between religion and party affiliation is different in different countries. Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005) show that in some countries (like India) religion correlates strongly with political affiliation but income does not. In other countries (like Sweden), income correlates strongly with political affiliation but religion does not. And in some places (like Spain) both income and religion correlate quite strongly with political affiliation.
These differences can't be explained by a general tendency of leaders to care more about social issues.
To explain these differences over space and time, Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005) present a model of strategic extremism where parties divide on issues not to appease the tastes of the leaders but rather to increase their chances of electoral success. As Downs (1957) intuited and Riker and Ordeshook (1973) proved, extremism (defined as party policies that differ from those of the marginal voter) hinge on a turnout margin. If everyone always votes, then moving away from the center is always costly for politicians trying to get elected. Extremism can become strategic, i.e. vote enhancing, only when there is a turnout margin so that by moving from the center, you excite your base and get them to come to the voting booths.
14 However, a turnout margin is not enough to ensure extremism. Even with a turnout margin, going to extremes has, in principle, equal likelihood of exciting your base and exciting your opponent's base in the opposite direction. As a result, a voting margin is not enough. There must also be an asymmetry so that extremism excites your supporters more than it enrages your opponent's supporters. Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005) suggest a natural source of this asymmetry: the ability to target messages towards one's own supporters. If your supporters hear your messages (speeches, platforms, etc.) more than your opponents, then going to extremes will increase support more than it increases opposition. In the model, the opposition support is not fooled: they correctly anticipate what you will be saying. Nonetheless, there is still an asymmetry, because if you don't take an extreme position then your own supporters will know that you are centrist and will fail to vote.
This model suggests that policy divisions will be closely tied to the ability to send coded The model suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that the influence of a social group is nonmonotonic and it peaks when the group represents slightly less than one-half of the population. The intuition of this is that when the group represents the entire population, it no longer provides an opportunity to target messages, and when the group represents no one, it is no longer an important political force. When the group is slightly less than onehalf of the population, then its key issues (economics in the case of unions and social issues in the case of churches) will come to dominate political division and debate.
One This theory then provides us with two hypotheses for the changing importance of economic and social issues in American politics and for the realignments throughout the 20 th century. One candidate is the rise and fall of unionization in America. At the beginning of the century, unions were a small part of the population. Only in small areas of the population did they provide an opportunity for targeting a significant fraction of the population. In mid-century, they rose to over 30 percent of all workers and today they are back down to 12 percent (Troy 1965, www.laborresearch.org) .
The rise and fall of unionization corresponds reasonably with the connection between income and Republicanism shown in Figure 10 . The middle decades of the 20 th century
were the high point of unionism and they were also the high point of the correlation between income and Republicanism. During this time period, the Democratic Party had access to the labor unions and this created an incentive for Democrats to move to the left on economic issues to get support in this important base. The rise and decline of unions provides at least one possible reason why economic issues rose and then fell in importance.
A second hypothesis explaining the rise and fall of religion is the changes in the religious market. Over the past 80 years, there has been a decline in the numbers of mainline Protestants and a rise in the number of evangelicals. According to this hypothesis, as the mainline Protestants declined in importance, the Republican Party stopped catering to their interests, and gradually switched to issues that were more significant to the growing numbers of evangelicals. Democrats have been more successful at connecting with the rise in non-Christian religious groups (Fogel, 2001) .
While this story makes perfect sense from a Republican stand point, it makes less sense for Democrats. Why didn't Democrats move to capture the votes of evangelicals?
Certainly, the presidency of Jimmy Carter suggests that this was far from impossible.
There are several hypotheses. First, Democratic policies towards civil rights had alienated a huge part of the evangelical population. Second, liberal elites in the Democratic Party were uncomfortable with moving to the right on social issues. Third, the Democrats were dominant during a period of rapid social change and had difficulty running against socially liberal policies that had been enacted and popular during their time in power.
This discussion has emphasized the role of religion as if churches were just another form of social group and as if religious views were no different than views over fiscal policy.
But in fact, many people take their religious views far more seriously than views on other topics, and this may also help us to understand why religion is so often an important part of politics. It may be far easier to motivate voters by appealing to core religious values than to topics like tax policy, and this may be the key reason why religion is so appealing to politicians.
Whatever the cause, the trends are clear. While Republicanism used to represent mainline Protestantism, it now represents evangelicalism. The ability to send targeted messages helps us understand why social groups, such as churches or unions, end up driving the key differences between parties. As such, we should neither be surprised at today's religious politics, nor at the politics of religion in the past. As long as churches provide politicians with an ability to send targeted messages to supporters, religious issues will be important in elections and parties will divide over religion.
Conclusion
There are many myths about America's political geography. There has not been any decrease in the number of swing states over time. Democrats and Republicans are no more geographically segregated than they have been in the past. Voting patterns may have become mildly more persistent than in the past, but persistence has usually been quite high, except for the 12 year period when the South left the Democratic fold.
Cultural heterogeneity is not increasing and most people are in the middle, not at the extremes (as in Fiorina et al., 2004) . Political hostility between the party members is relatively constant, although there has been an uptick in hostility over the last four years.
But all of these myths should not obscure two primary truths about American political geography. First, America is a nation with an astonishing degree of cultural diversity.
The Red State/Blue State framework makes it appear that regions fall into one of two groups and this is false. There is a continuum of states ranging from the poor conservative places of the south and west to the rich, liberal places of the coasts. These places are quite different and they have been so for many years. At the state or county level, these differences line up well with political affiliation.
The roots of these geographic differences seem to come from two primary sources:
industrialization and immigration. Places that industrialized earlier and that attracted more immigrants at the start of the century are much more likely to have socially liberal attitudes, much less likely to take prayer seriously, and less likely to vote Republican.
These forces appear to be much more important in predicting attitudes and politics than the legacy of the Civil War, or long-standing religious differences. One theory that can explain the power of immigration and early industrialization is that the cultural attitudes associated with the Democratic party (downplaying Religion and emphasizing some forms of tolerance) reflect the long run effect of ethnically and religiously heterogeneous populations interacting over many decades in the marketplace
The second great truth is that American parties are increasing oriented around religion and culture rather than economics. This change has occurred since the 1970s, but in broader historical perspective it is the 1932-1976 period that is exceptional, not the current epoch. Prior to 1932, religion also predicted voting, but during that era the key correlation was between Republicanism and mainline Protestantism.
Why has religion or culture played such an important role in American party divisions?
We offer two explanations. Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005) show that parties divide along issues where they have the ability to send targeted messages to their supporters. Religious groups provide just this ability. Second, voting is innately irrational, and emotional cultural topics may be much more effective in getting people into the voting booth than naked self-interest. 1 9 0 0 1 9 0 4 1 9 0 8 1 9 1 2 1 9 1 6 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 4 1 9 2 8 1 9 3 2 1 9 3 6 1 9 4 0 1 9 4 4 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 6 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 6 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 6 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 
